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\·?EBER BASIN WATER CONSERV- \ 
ANCY DISTRICT, I 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
\ 
HAROLD L. WARD, C. ARNOLD / 
FERRIN and LUCILLE N. FERRIN, \ 
his wife, LESLIE OLSEN and JESSIE 
OLSEN, his wife, et al., 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District from a judgment of the District Court of Weber 
County on a verdict for $59,339.00 in consolidated actions 
by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, hereinafter 
referred to as the "District," and the State of Utah to condemn 
land for use in the construction of the enlarged Pineview 
:Uam and Reservoir, a part of the Weber Basin Reclamation 
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Project. Separate suits were filed by the District and the State 
and separate orders of immediate occupancy were taken. The 
cases were consolidated only for the trial. There are some 
twenty-one defendants in the District case but only the defend-
ants C. Arnold Ferrin, Lucille N. Ferrin, Leslie Olsen and 
Jessie Olsen were involved in the trial and are involved in this 
appeal. The legal title to the property being condemned is in 
the Ferrins and the farm is being sold under contract to the 
Olsens. The State of Utah has not appealed. 
Whenever the word "defendants" is used it refers only 
to Leslie Olsen and Jessie Olsen, his wife. The transcript is 
referred to as (R. ____ ), the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District file will be referred to as (F. ____ ), and the State case 
will be referred to as (State F. ____ ). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants are the owners of 496 acres of land near 
Eden, in Ogden Valley, consisting of 360 acres of mountain 
range land, and 136 acres in the valley used for pasture, hay, 
grain and the farmstead. Exhibit A shows the farm. The area 
colored yellow, consisting of 66.8 acres, is that sought to be 
taken by the District, and the green area, consisting of 5.66 
acres, is that sought by the State. The land remaining is colored 
red. Exhibit 2 is a photograph showing the defendants' build-
ings consisting of a brick home, a hired man's house, machine 
shed, calf lounging shed, garage, granary, milk parlor, 2 barns, 
lounging shed and catch pen. The farm had been used by the 
defendants for the operation of a dairy for seven years pre-
ceding the trial. The defendants kept 48 to 50 head of cows 
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and 12 or 15 young stock. Werner Kiepe, plaintiff's appraiser, 
testified that the farm was over-improved; that if the buildings 
were to burn down "they would never be replaced, because 
they would not fit into a modern dairy operation with its mod-
ern buildings" (R. 255). 
The defendants' valley land was in part sub-irrigated and 
the higher land was irrigated from the Eden Irrigation Com-
pany system. The defendants own certificate No. 50 for 77 
shares in the Eden Irrigation Company and Mr. Olsen testified 
that he used about one-fourth of this irrigation water to irrigate 
the land taken by the District (R. 41). 
The defendants called three witnesses to testify as to 
values, Mr. Olsen, D. Ray Wilkinson and Lubin A. Welker. 
Wilkinson and Welker collaborated in the preparation of a 
single report. Mr. Olsen testified from that report. Therefore, 
the defendants' testimony as to values was taken from one 
report summarized as follows: 
Value of 66.8 acres taken by 
District ------------------------------------$40,080.00 (R. 30) 
Severance damages resulting 
from taking by both State and 
District -------------------------------------- 30,120.00 (R. 30) 
TotaL ____________________________ $ 70,200.00 
The District called as a witness, Werner Kiepe, who tes-
tified as to values and severance damages as follows: 
Value of 66.8 acres taken 
by District ----------------------------------$21,010.00 (R. 204) 
Severance damages resulting 
from taking by both the 
State and District --------------------$14,430.00 (R. 251) 
TotaL ____________________________ $35,440.00 
'5 
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The defendants' witnesses testified that the farm was 
peculiarly suited for a profitable dairy operation, and that the 
taking of the land by the District and the State in effect de-
stroyed its usefulness for that purpose. 
"Q. From your experience as a dairy farmer, and your 
general know ledge of the industry in general, what 
is the minimum number of dairy cows required to 
make a profitable operation ? 
A. At the present time 30 to 40 head, I would say. 
Q. That would be a minimum? 
A. Yes, sir" (R. 23). 
Similar testimony was given by the defendants' other witnesses. 
Upon cross-examination, every effort was made by the 
District to find out from Mr. Olsen whether the dairy operation 
was in fact profitable before the taking. He was asked to pro-
duce his income tax returns for the years 1951 to 1956 inclusive, 
which he did. The returns were offered in evidence. The trial 
court sustained an objection to them (R. 47). Mr. Olsen was 
called by the District as an adverse witness (R. 257) and was 
asked whether he had realized a net profit from the operation 
of his dairy farm in 1955 (R. 259}. Objection ·was made and 
overruled. He answered "I don't know." (R. 259). :Mr. Olsen 
was then handed his 1955 income tax return and he was asked 
to examine it and then answer the question. Objection was 
made and sustained (R. 259). The following then occurred: 
"Q. Do you know whether you operated the dairy 
farm at a profit from 1951 to 1956, inclusive? (R. 
260) 
A. No, sir. 
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MR. YOUNG: The same objection, if the Court please. 
Q. You don't know? 
THE COURT: The answer may stand. 
Q. You don't know? 
A. No, sir. 
MR. SKEEN: If the Court please, I would like to go 
into other matters that I'm sure counsel will object 
to, and Your Honor has already indicated that you 
would sustain the objections, and rather than ask 
the jury to leave while I make the offer I would 
like to have the privilege of making the offer after 
the jury retires, and having it made part of the 
record. 
THE COURT: I'll be glad to retire the jury for that 
purpose. 
Again, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, remem-
ber the admonition of the Court. We'll call you 
when we want you. 
(Thereupon the jury retired from the Courtroom 
and the following proceedings were had in its ab-
sence:) 
Q. Mr. Olsen, what was the purchase price of your 
farm in 1950? The price you paid for it? 
MR. YOUNG: I make the same objection I have here-
tofore made. 
THE COURT: Now what do you claim for this, Mr. 
Skeen? 
MR. SKEEN: Well, if the Court please, I have done 
a little research on this matter of introducing evi-
dence as to the purchase price of the very farm in 
question, and its admissibility, and there is a dif-
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ference of opinion among the Courts as to how 
far back you can go, but ordinarily it is admissible 
if it's not too remote. There are numerous cases 
holding that a purchase within seven and a half or 
eight years of the time of the taking is admissible 
evidence. 
THE COURT: How can that have any relation to the 
value of the property at the time of the taking? 
MR. SKEEN: Well, we have in the record the testi-
mony as to increases in property values between 
1950 and 1956. This land was bought in 1950 and 
sold in '56, and I think it's competent evidence and 
I think it's very enlightening in this case. 
At any rate I'd like to make the record on it, 
and if Your Honor intends to sustain the objec-
tion I'd like to make a formal offer to prove with 
this witness on the stand. 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection to 
the question, Mr. Skeen. You may make your offer 
of proof. 
MR. SKEEN: Comes now the Plaintiff Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District, and offers to prove 
with Mr. Olsen on the stand that he bought the 
farm in litigation, including the livestock on the 
farm, the farm machinery, the improvements and 
all of the land, including not only the land shown 
on the exhibits A and 1, but also the grazing land 
referred to, for a total of $69,470.00. 
That he estimated that the livestock at that time 
were worth $25,000.00. That since that date-well, 
the record already shows what improvements he 
put on the property, and the approximate value, 
since that date. 
MR. YOUNG: I renew my objection, if the Court 
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please. The danger of course is that if a man makes 
a good buy he shouldn't be penalized. That doesn't 
affect the fair cash market value of this property 
on the day of the taking. We know of lots of in-
stances where people have been shrewd enough to 
buy property at a bargain (R. 262) . 
THE COURT: I'm going to sustain the objection." 
!~he following offer of proof was made by the District 
respecting the question as to whether the dairy farm was a 
profitable operation before the taking. 
"MR. SKEEN: Earlier in the trial the Plaintiffs offered 
to prove, from the Defendant Olsen's income tax 
returns, profits and losses from the year 1951 to 
1956, inclusive, and gave some figures, some of 
which were correct and others incorrect (R. 277). 
The following are the correct figures taken from 
the farm schedule of the Defendant Olsen's income 
tax returns: Net profit for 1951, $41.58. Loss in 
1952, $11,108.35. Loss in 1953, $4,338.28. Loss 
in 1954, $3,948.71. Loss in 1955, $2,971.58. Profit 
in 1956, $681.07. 
THE COURT: Mr. Young, you may take your excep-
tions. 
MR. YOUNG: I want to state in connection with that, 
if the Court please, that the income tax returns 
from which counsel obtained this information shows 
on its face that it involves an entire complex oper-
ation of other properties, and is not a reflection 
of profit and loss, even under his theory, of the 
operation of the farm. It's the result which was 
obtained from his combined operations as a whole" 
(R. 278). , 
The trial court included among the instructions to the 
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jury I'~o. 6 relating to the upsetting of the economic balance 
of the dairy farm as follows: 
No.6. 
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in 
this case that the entire farm owned by defendants 
constituted a unit operation, to-wit: A dairy farm; and 
that the taking of a part of this farm has upset the 
economic balance of the farm and thus has damaged 
that part of the farm not condemned; and if you 
further find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
at the time of the taking by plaintiffs there was not 
available comparable lands in the area of the con-
demned lands which could be purchased by the de-
fendants, thereby restoring to defendants the economic 
balance of said farm for the purpose to which said 
farm as a unit, to-wit, a dairy farm, was being used) 
and as a consequence thereof the taking of the portions 
of said farm by plaintiffs has depreciated the fair 
market value of the remaining property, at the time of 
the taking, then you should consider these facts in ar-
riving at the amount of severance damages to be award-
ed to the defendants in this case (R. 271). 
The court did not define severance damage or instruct 
the jury as to how to determine severance. The court refused 
to give the District's requested instruction No. 5 as follows: 
The property sought to be condemned, shown in 
yellow on plaintiff's exhibit A, consists of only a part 
of the defendants' property and leaves the defendants 
the adjoining land shown on plaintiff's exhibit A. You 
are instructed that you may include in the just com-
pensation to be awarded to the defendants, the dam-
ages to the remaining Lmd caused by the severance 
of the part sought to be condemned from the remain-
ing property. The just compensation is the difference 
10 
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in money between the fair market value of the entire 
farm land and improvements on December 12, 1956, 
before the proposed taking and the amount of the 
fair market value of the remaining land and improve-
ments as of December 12, 1956, after the taking. 
Your total award cannot exceed this difference. The 
part of the just compensation which constitutes the 
allowable severance damage is the amount left after 
deducting the fair market value of the property taken 
from the amount of just compensation determined 
as above. This difference is the severance damage. 
However, before any severance damages can be al-
lowed, there must be evidence that there was no avail-
able comparable land in the area of the condemned 
land of December 12, 1956 (State F. 41). 
The verdict insofar as it relates to this appeal was as fol-
lows: 
"
1W e, the jury impanelled in the above-entitled 
cause, find the issues in favor of the Defendants and 
against the Plaintiffs, as follows: 
1. \'\!hat was the fair cash market value of the 66.8 
acres of land, together with the water located thereon 
and other improvements sought to be condemned by 
plaintiff Weber Basin Water Conservancy District? 
(R. 281). 
Answer: $33,400.00. 
2. (This answer involved only the state land and 
is not pertinent to this appeal.) 
3. What amount, if any, do you find that the remain-
ing portion of the premises not being condemned has 
depreciated in value by reason of the taking of the 
lands sought to be condemned by both plaintiffs and 
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Answer: $23,109.00. 
Dated: January 28, 1958. 
Frank E. Little, Foreman." 
Judgment was entered on the verdict. 
The District filed a motion for a new trial upon the follo\""1-
ing grounds (R. 89) : 
1. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the answer 
to question number 1 in the Special Verdict. 
2. Errors of law at the trial consisting of 
(a) The Court's refusal to admit evidence as to the 
purchase price which the defendants Leslie Olsen 
and Jessie Olsen agreed to pay to C. Arnold Ferrin 
and Lucille Ferrin for the property sought to be 
condemned. 
(b) The Court's refusal to admit evidence as to profits 
and losses of the defendants Leslie Olsen and Jessie 
Olsen in the operation of the dairy business on 
the land sought to be condemned from 1952 to 
1956 inclusive as shown by Income Tax returns. 
(c) The giving of instruction number 6 for the reason 
that said instruction is general and contains such 
undefined terms as ··economic balance of the 
farm." 
(d) The refusal of the court to give plaintiff, Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy District, requested in-
truction number 5 relating to severance damages. 
(e) The Court erred in failing and refusing to instruct 
fully and adequately on the subject of severance 
damages. 
(f) The Court erred in giving instruction number 9 
and particularly the first paragraph thereof, which 
12 
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implies that improvements as well as land were 
condemned by plaintiffs. 
(g) The Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' motion to 
strike all of the defendants' evidence as to sever-
ance damages (R. 90). 
The motion was denied. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. There is insufficient evidence to support the answer to 
question No. 1 of the verdict. 
2. The Court erred in refusing to admit evidence (a) to 
show that the farm was not profitably operated as a dairy 
farm before the taking, and (b) to show the purchase price 
paid for the farm by the defendants; thereby improperly limit-
ing cross-examination. 
3. The Court erred m g1v1ng instruction No. 6, which 
implies that the defendants' farm was an economic dairy unit 
before the taking. 
4. The Court erred in failing adequately to instruct the 
jury on severance damages. 
1. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE VERDICT. 
The argument under this point is directed to the insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the answer to question No. 
1 as follows: 
What was the fair cash market value of the 66.8 
acres of land together with the water located thereon 
13 
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and other improvements sought to be condemned by 
plaintiff Weber Basin Water Conservancy District? 
Answer: $33,400.00. 
If $33,400.00 is divided by 66.8, the result is $500.00. 
Let us examine the record to determine whether there is any 
evidence to support such a figure. As indicated above, although 
three witnesses testified on values there was in fact only one 
appraisal made. Witnesses Wilkinson and Welker made an 
appraisal report and the defendant Olsen in giving his testimony 
simply read from the report. (R. 32). The report stated that 
the value of the 66.8 acres taken by the District was $40,080.00, 
which figures out at $600.00 per acre for all land taken. 
It was brought out on cross examination of Mr. Wilkinson 
that his figure of $600.00 per acre was largely based upon 
unaccepted offers of land for sale. He knew of no sales of 
comparable land. We quote: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Wilkinson, just 'vhere did you get +-his 
figure of $600.00 an acre, if you know of no com-
parable sales up there in that area? (R. 92). 
A. Well, I didn't know of any comparable sales, but 
I had a client who wanted to purchase some land 
in that area and I went to a number of places, and 
I have bona fide listings here of four places up 
there that are offering their property for sale, and 
every one of them is more than $600.00 an acre. 
Q. In other words your testimony then is based upon 
unaccepted offers of certain property in that area 
for sale? 
A. Not entirely. 
Q. Well, do you know of any actual sales? 
14 
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A. I answered that. 
Q. You don't? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Well, now, if you are appra1s1ng property, and 
there are no comparable property sales, no accepted 
offers, will you tell me again how you arrive at your 
figure? (R. 99) 
A. I use my own judgment. 
Q. And you base that judgment upon what? 
A. What I see. 
Q. You don't care what the land produces? 
A. Well, there used to be a time when you sold land 
that way, but since the things are inflated such as 
they are now why it's a difficult thing to appraise 
land from that basis. 
Q. So you just base your opinion then on just looking 
at the land and picking a figure out of the air? 
A. No. All the other information I can get from any-
where. 
Q. Well, what other information did you have? That 
is what I'm anxious to get. 
A. Well, I had the-
Q. Don't go over the unaccepted offers and so on, be-
cause we have been all over that, but anything new 
that you haven't mentioned that had something to 
do with your judgment I'd like to hear about. 
A. I think I mentioned everything. 
Q. Pardon me? 
15 
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A. I think I have mentioned everything. 
Q. You have mentioned everything you based your 
opinion on? 
A. That's right." (R. 100). 
He testified further that in his opinion, farm lands in the 
vicinity of Ogden had increased in value substantially between 
1950 and 1956 and further that there had been an increase 
in value because of the enlargement of Pineview Reset'voir. 
He declined to say how much of the increase had been due 
to this cause. 
Mr. Welker gave the same testimony as to the value of 
the 66.8 acres of Mr. Wilkinson. The following quotation from 
the record indicates the basis for Mr. Welker's opinion of 
values: 
"Q. Your judgment then of $600.00 an acre was just 
based on what you saw on the place, and had no 
reference to comparable sales of other land in the 
area; is that right? (R. 125). 
A. It was my opinion as to the fair value of it. 
Q. It was just based on what you saw on the ground, 
is that right? 
A. Well, what I saw on the ground, from my experi· 
ence and my judgment. 
Q. And then you'd answer definitely that it was not 
based on any comparable sales ? 
A. Oh, I think comparable sales entered into it a lot. 
Q. With your mental operations; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir (R. 126). 
16 
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Q. But you don't know of any land up there ever hav-
ing been sold for $600.00 an acre? 
A. I didn't say that. 
Q. Isn't that a fact? 
A. Well, I know of people that have certified a will-
ingness to pay more than $600.00 an acre for land, 
if I could get it. 
Q. You don't know of any actual sales for that amount? 
A. I know of offers. I know of offers that have been 
made, but they were refused. 
Q. But you don't know of any actual sales? 
A. No, sir. They wouldn't sell. Wouldn't sell similar 
land. 
Q. That's been right recently, hasn't it? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You know of course that there has been quite a lot 
of interest in subdivision property around the new 
lake, and recreational areas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. For speculative purposes? You know that, don't 
you? 
A. Yes, sir, I know that. 
Q. And you know that there have been quite a few 
offers to buy land that looks favorable for sub-
division and recreation ? 
A. I have heard there has been some." 
-1 
The rule is well settled that offers are inadmissible except 
1
1 
\. ,.,. ,, 
as admissions against the owner, Orgel on Valuation, p. 494. ----
17 
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Mr. Welker agreed with Mr. Wilkinson that the con-
struction of the enlarged Pineview Reservoir, the improvement 
for which this land was condemned, had affected his estimate 
of value. On cross-examination he testified as follows (R. 116): 
"Q. Mr. Welker, in fixing this figure at $600.00 per 
acre, did you take into consideration the growing 
scarcity of meadow land up in that area, due to the 
enlargement of Pine View Reservoir? 
A. I think that has affected the values. 
Q. You took into consideration, did you not, in fixing 
this figure of $600.00? 
A. I think that would have affected the value. 
Q. Well, now, do you have an estimate as to how much 
it affected the value? One-third, one-fourth, or some 
other amount? 
A. Oh, a guess would be about one-fourth perhaps. 
Q. In other words your appraisal would have been 
$450.00 an acre, except for the fact that this reser-
voir is being enlarged; is that right? 
A. Perhaps. 
Q. Well, if it's right say it's right. If it's not, why 
change it. I want your testimony ,and I think the 
jury should have it. "Perhaps" or "I guess" doesn't 
mean anything. 
A. Well, let's say yes then. 
Q. Pardon me? 
A. Yes." (R. 117). 
The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case 
of United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 87 L. ed. 33 7, that 
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an increment of value in land being condemned attributable to 
the improvement for which the land is taken cannot be con-
sidered in determining value. We quote from the opinion: 
898. 
"There is, however, another possible element of 
market value, which is the bone of contention here. 
Should the owner have the benefit of any increment 
of value added to the property taken by the action 
of the public authority in previously condemning ad-
jacent land? If so, were the lands in question so situate 
as to entitle respondents to the benefit of this incre-
ment ... " (87 L. ed. at page 343). 
''The question then is whether the respondent's 
lands were probably within the scope of the project 
from the time the Government was committed to it. 
If they were not, but were merely adjacent lands, the 
subsequent enlargement of the project to include them 
ought not to deprive the respondents of the value 
added in the meantime by the proximity of the im-
provement. If, on the other hand, they were, the 
Government ought not to pay any increase in value 
arising from the known fact that the lands probably 
would be condemned. The owners ought not to gain 
by speculating on probable increase in value due to 
the Government's activities." ( 8 7 L. ed. at page 344). 
This rule has been approved and followed. 
United States v. Cors, 337 U. S. 325, 93 L. ed. 1392. 
Harris v. Wyandotte County, 151 Kans. 946, 101 P. 2d 
Annotation: 147 A.L.R. 66. 
On page 68 in the American Law Report note cited 
~bove the author states that the great weight of authority 
denies to the owner the right to recover an increase or en-
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hancement due to the proposed improvement in the value of 
the land taken. 
If we take the defendants' witnesses testimony at face 
value the record would not support a verdict in excess of 
$450.00 per acre. Although the landowner, Mr. Olsen, testified 
that the land was worth $600.00 per acre, he admitted on 
cross-examination that he was simply reading from the report 
prepared by his appraisers (R. 32). The following question 
and answer indicate this: 
"Q. Well, you have testified as to the value of the 66.8 
acres as $40,080.00. Will you state whether you 
have an opinion as to how that $40,080.00 was 
arrived at? I mean know of your knowledge? 
A. Well, I'd say no sir." 
The maximum value per acre of the 66.8 acres not at-
tributable to the Pineview enlargement, which is supported 
by the evidence, is $450.00 per acre, and it is apparent from 
the testimony quoted above that that figure was "picked out 
of the air." This would amount to $30,060.00, or $3,340.00 
less than the answer to question No. 1. It will be recalled 
that Mr. Kiepe' s testimony was that the fair market value 
of 66.8 acres was $21,010.00. The answer to question No. 1 
in the verdict exceeded substantially the evidence before the 
jury as to the value of the 66.8 acres, and the case must be 
reversed for this reason alone. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
AS TO (a) FARM OPERATION LOSSES, AND (b) THE 
PURCHASE PRICE PAID BY THE OLSENS FOR THE 
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FAR1v1 INVOLVED IN THIS SUIT, THEREBY IMPROPER-
LY LIMITH~G CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
(a) It was the theory of the defendants that the highest 
and best use of their farm was for a dairy; that because of 
its location and the kinds of land of which it was comprised, 
it was peculiarly adapted for that use, and that it was one of 
the better dairy farms in Ogden Valley. The testimony of 
the defendant, Leslie Olsen, Mr. Felt, Mr. Story, and the real 
estate men-Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Welker-was all to this 
effect (R. 20-23; 69, 70, 105-107, 132-135, 141-143). The 
jury undoubtedly got the impression that the farm was an 
excellent dairy farm, had been operated by a good farmer, 
and was a profitable enterprise. The plaintiff had only one 
way to meet such testimony and that was to show by the 
actual records of the farm that it was not a successful dairy 
farm operation. The plaintiff notified the defendants to pro-
duce their income tax returns for the entire period of their 
operation of the farm. They were produced by the defendants 
and as indicated above, showed that the farm was operated 
as follows: 
19 51 ____________________________________________________ Profit 
19 52 ____________________________________________________ Loss 
195 3 ____________________________________________________ Loss 
1954 ____________________________________________________ Loss 
19 55 ____________________________________________________ Loss 







Over the six years of operation the aggregate loss was 
$22,366.92. In the two years when there was a profit the total 
was $722.65. 
The plaintiff offered the returns in evidence and the 
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defendants' objection was sustained (R. 43-47). Later in the 
trial the defendant, Leslie Olsen, was called by the plaintiff 
and asked whether his operation of the dairy in 195 5 was 
profitable. He answered that he did not know. He was then 
handed the income tax return for that year and was asked 
to examine it and then answer the question. The court sus-
tained the defendants' objection (R. 259). This was error 
because it in effect took away the plaintiff's right of cross-
examination upon one of the most essential points in the case. 
It has been held that in a condemnation case, evidence 
as to annual crops and income is admissible for the purpose 
of determining the value of farming land. 
Orgel on Valuation, pp. 548, 549. 
Weyer v. Chicago W & N. R. Co., 68 Wis. 180, 31 N.W. 
710. 
Cushing v. Pote, 128 Okla. 303, 262 P. 1070. 
Stolze v. Manitowoc Terminal Co., 100 Wis. 208, 75 N.W. 
987. 
DeFreitas v. Suisun City, 170 Cal. 263, 149 P. 553. 
Annotation: 65 A.L.R. 455. 
In the Weyer case, supra, the court said: 
"In estimating the value of farming land, its pro-
ductiveness or the income which may be derived from 
it is always considered. Indeed there is no better nor 
sa fer criterion than this to get at its real value." 
'fhis is a stronger case for admissibility of evidence of 
profi.ts than those cited above, because here the evidence was 
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offered on cross-examination to show that the farm was not a 
balanced economic dairy unit, and clearly it was proper to 
test the credibility of the defendant, Olsen, in this manner. 
In 1950 Arnold Ferrin and Lucille Ferrin, his wife, sold 
to Leslie Olsen and Jessie Olsen, his wife, the farm involved 
in this condemnation suit. On cross-examination Mr. Olsen 
was asked to state the amount of the purchase price shown 
m the contract for the purpose of testing the validity of his 
testimony and its credibility. The court sustained an objection 
upon the ground that such testimony was incompetent, irrele-
vant, immaterial and too remote (R. 36). Later, Mr. Kiepe 
was asked to repeat what Mr. Olsen had told him about the 
purchase of the farm from Ferrin. Objection was sustained 
(R. 206, 207). However, Mr. Kiepe did testify that Olsen pur-
chased the property in September, 1950 (R. 207). This was 
6 years and 3 months before the "taking date," December, 
1956. 
The following is a quotation from 5 Nichols on Eminent 
Domain, page 267: 
"When a parcel of land is taken by eminent domain, 
the price which the owner paid for it when he acquired 
it is one of the most important pieces of evidence in 
determining its present value, provided the sale was 
recent, and was a voluntary transaction between parties 
each of whom was capable and desirous of protecting 
bis own interest and no change in condition or marked 
fluctuation in values has occurred since the sale. A price 
paid under such conditions is a circumstance which a 
prospective purchaser would seriously consider in de-
termining what he himself should pay for the property; 
as evidence before a jury it consumes little time in 
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introduction and raises few collateral issues so that 
every argument is in favor of its admissibility." 
There is a great diversity in the cases as to the period 
of time in which the previous sale was made, as affecting the 
admissibility of evidence. Also, there is some difference of 
opinion as to the purpose of the evidence. See: 
Ohio Turnpike Com. v. Ellis, 164 Ohio St. 377, 131 
N.E. 2d, 397. 
Palmer v. St. Highway Com., 195 N.C. 1, 141 S.E. 338. 
Epstein v. City of Denver, 293 P. 2d 308, Colo. 
In the recent work entitled "Just Compensation," by 
Kaltenbach, the author makes the following statement on 
pages 41 and 42: 
"There is no exception to the general rule with 
respect to this topic. All of the cases cited in the State 
Summaries hold that the general rule permits evidence 
of previous sales of the condemned property to be 
introduced, subject to two conditions; namely, that the 
sale must have been made within a reasonable time 
so that it has some bearing on the market value at the 
time of the taking, and also that the sale must have 
been voluntary. Subject to the foregoing conditions, 
evidence of the sale of the condemned property is ad-
missible. 
The courts vary quite substantially on what is a 
reasonable time. Up to eight years has generally been 
considered not too remote, although one jurisdiction 
did rule that seven and one-half years was too remote. 
Usually anything over eight years is too remote. How-
ever, in one case, evidence of a sale made thirteen years 
previous! y was permitted. In another case, the exclusion 
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of evidence of a sale that had occurred two years pre-
viously was held not to be reversible error, although 
the upper court said that the evidence should have been 
admitted." 
The court improperly limited the cross-examination of 
the defendant, Olsen. 
In State v. Peek (Utah), 265 P. 2d 630 at page 637, Mr. 
Justice Wade, writing the opinion, made an excellent statement 
regarding the scope of cross-examination in cases of this kind: 
"There is no other instrument so well adapted to 
discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and as 
long as it tends to disclose the truth it should never 
be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should be allowed 
which an individual about to buy would feel it in his 
interest to make." 
In 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 183, Section 18.45 (2), 
it is said: 
* * * * 
The scope of the cross-examination of experts and 
other witnesses who have testified to value in land 
damage cases is very broad, since cross-examination is 
often the only protection of the opposing party against 
the unwarranted estimates that a certain class of mer-
cenary experts is wont to indulge in. A witness may 
be asked on cross-examination any facts which would 
be admissible on direct examination. 
* * * * 
A witness who has given an opinion of value may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, be asked ques-
tions on cross-examination, for the purpose of testing 
his opinion, which would be improper upon direct 
examination. 
* * * * 
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The opm10n of a witness may be impeached by 
showing that his acts are inconsistent with his words, 
as for example by showing that he has offered the 
same or similar property for sale at a price far different 
from what he now says it is worth, or he may be asked 
whether he has not made inconsistent statements upon 
the same point upon other occasions. He may be asked 
what the owner paid for the property or what he has 
been offered for it. Should the fact stated be material, 
and should the witness, after having been afforded a 
reasonable opportunity for explanation, deny the mak-
ing of the statement mentioned, the fact may be proved 
by other witnesses at a later stage" (emphasis added). 
As stated above, the only protection the condemnor has 
against "unwarranted estimates" of value is cross-examination. 
A denial or limitation of that right may, and undoubtedly 
often does, have serious consequences. The landowner is en-
titled to just compensation, but the public, represented by 
the condemning agency, is entitled to place before the jury 
evidence tending to show that the landowner and his experts 
are making wild and exaggerated estimates. As was well stated 
by Mr. Justice Wade, as long as cross-examination rrtends to 
disclose the truth it should never be curtailed or limited." The 
trial court ignored this important rule and left the jury with 
only half the story as to value, damages and "economic bal-
ance." This was reversible error. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NO.6. 
The full text of instruction No. 6 is given above on page 
10. It will be noted that the jury was instructed that if the 
taking of a part of this farm rr baJ UjlJe/ the el'01JOI!li( ba/ana 
of the ft~mr'' and there is no comparable land available for re-
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placement, "and as a consequence thereof the taking of the por-
tions of said farm by plaintiffs has depreciated the fair market 
value of the remaining property, at the time of the taking, then 
you should consider these facts in arriving at the amount of 
severance damages to be awarded to the defendants in this 
case." The instruction implies that the farm had rr economic 
balcmce" before the condemnation of part of the land. This 
was clearly an invitation to the jury to award severance damages 
for destruction of the dairy business which is contrary to law. 
It is cleverly worded to tie such severance damages to the 
remaining lands and buildings, but any jury would take the 
meaning to be that if the ·'economic balance'' of the farm 
is upset, and it is no longer possible to run a dairy on the farm, 
substantial severance damages are in order. Emphasis was 
placed on the dairy and rr economic balance" and was taken 
away from the market value of the remaining lands and build-
ings for other purposes. 
The law is well settled that damage to a business operation 
ts not compensable. 
18. Am. Jur., Section 259. 
Bothwell v. United States, 254 U.S. 231, 65 L. ed. 238. 
Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 69 L. ed 644. 
The instruction was especially prejudical because of the 
refusal of the trial court to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine 
the defendant on profits and losses to show that the dairy farm 
was not a successful operation. The jury undoubtedly assumed, 
as the instruction clearly implied, that the farm was an eco-
nomically balanced dairy operation which was destroyed by 
the taking. The result was an excessive award of severance 
damages. This was reversible error. 
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4. THE JURY WAS NOT INSTRUCTED ON SEV-
ERANCE DAMAGES. 
The court refused to give the plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion No. 5 which explains the meaning of the term "severance 
damages" and properly instructs the jury on the method of 
determining them. There is much testimony in the record re-
specting such matters as "damage to the dairy business;" "being 
put out of the dairy business," and "upsetting an economic 
unit" and the jury may well have considered that to be "sever-
ance damages" in the absence of a proper instruction. 
The requested instruction followed closely the ruling of 
this court in the case of State v. Ward, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 
2d 113, to the effect that the difference in market value before 
and after condemnation is the proper measure of damages. 
The trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury in the 
regard undoubtedly contributed substantially to the excessive 
verdict and justifies reversal of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
The insufficiency of the evidence to support the answer to 
question No. 1 in the verdict, the improper and highly preju-
dicial limitation of plaintiff's cross-examination of the de-
fendant Olsen, and the court's error in giving and refusing 
to give instructions require reversal of this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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